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Abstract The enduring crisis in Ukraine presents the Euro-
pean Union (EU) with a conundrum. Should it strengthen its
economic and energy ties despite Russia’s growing assertive-
ness in the hope to solidify its medium term energy security
and reel in Russian foreign policy? Or should it rather contin-
ue to tighten the screws on the Putin regime, in the hope that
doing so will concurrently compel the Russian Federation to
moderate its behaviour? This paper argues that it is not pru-
dent for the EU to decrease cooperation with Russia in the
short term, but rather push for a political solution without
additional sanctions and in the long-term secure different
fossil resources such as LNG and different suppliers such as
Iraq and Iran. Whichever way the EU chooses, Ukraine’s role
in EU energy security is depreciating. Nevertheless, the EU
possesses a stronger bargaining position than widely believed
because Russia lacks a credible alternative to European for-
eign direct investments (FDI). The EU should (1) establish an
energy union that includes gas storage and distribution plans
and extends the Energy Community to include Turkey to pave
the way for future gas flows; (2) support infrastructure pro-
jects that increase reverse flow capacities within the EU as
well as South Stream or its heirs and the Southern Corridor via
Turkey to enhance import capacity; and (3) massively invest
into energy research.
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The enduring crisis in Ukraine presents the European Union
(EU) with a conundrum about the future of EU-Russian
relations, a choice of preference about two very different
futures. Should it move to strengthen its economic and partic-
ularly its energy ties to Russia despite its growing assertive-
ness in Ukraine and its near abroad in the hope that doing so
will strengthen its medium term energy security and reel in
Russian foreign policy? Or should it rather tighten the screws
on the Putin regime, as it is currently doing, in hopes that this
will concurrently compel the Russian Federation to moderate
its increasingly assertive foreign policy and anchor Ukraine
tightly into the Western fold?
The choice is not necessarily an easy one. Europe is divid-
ed on the importance of Russia’s role in European energy
security. For example, Russian gas is more important for
Germany and Italy than it is for France and the UK. Yet even
if one assumes that the Union actually could decrease its gas
cooperation with Russia in the near term, and thus move now
tomitigate future gas interruptions, one has to ask whether it is
in the long-term interest of the EU to reduce, let alone break, a
trade relationship that has profited both neighbours for de-
cades. The choices made now will have serious consequences
in the future. As the Economist recently observed, it is cer-
tainly possible to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas,
“but it will take time, money and sustained political will” [1].
Whichever direction Europe chooses, there will be serious
consequences for the future of EU-Russian relations as well
as the costs of European energy bills.
The view one has depends to a large extent on one’s
assumptions about the strength of Europe’s negotiating
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position, Russia’s intentions in its near abroad, its reliability as
a supplier, and the notion of whether an economically strong
or weak Russia is good or bad for EU strategic interests.While
the EU’s position is far from strong, it is not weak. While the
EU still lacks a short or medium term alternative to Russian
gas, Russia equally lacks a credible alternative to European
foreign direct investments (FDI) and that gives the EU’s
bargaining position more teeth than one might initially think.
Moscow’s recently concluded 30-year, $400 billion deal to
pipe natural gas from Russia’s Far East to China [2,3] is not a
game changer because it averages out to less than €13,5 billion
per year in revenue; and while Russia appears to earnmore per
thousand cubic meters ($350/€274) [4] than it earned from
European customers (€229) in 2013, the relatively low vol-
ume appears more designed to enhance Russian export secu-
rity alongside rather than to replace Europe as a consumer.
Beyond the punditry and rhetoric, Russia has proven to be
a reliable supplier since it began delivering gas to Western
Europe in the late 1960s. A move to break that partnership
over Ukraine may be popular, but is it prudent? Will it benefit
Europe’s interests in the short to medium term? Russian gas is
still cheaper than imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). In-
deed, some have suggested that UK prices would have to
double to make LNG attractive [5] and the US does not appear
ready to export massive amounts anytime in the near term; and
if it did, there is little economic reason for its exports not to go
to Asia where prices are higher. Meanwhile, domestic hydrau-
lic fracturing (fracking) is not likely to offer respite in the near
term and certainly will not enhance solidarity as witnessed by
the heated debate between the member states about its eco-
nomic viability and environmental sustainability.
A complete or even substantial shift away from Russian
gas supplies will not reduce the geopolitical risks that Europe
faces along its eastern border. Indeed, freed from the con-
straints of having to balance its financial and political interests
vis-à-vis Brussels and barring a sea change in European
attitudes toward hostile military engagements,Moscowwould
be free to implement any political order it sees fit throughout
its historic geographic buffer zone. Thus, this article argues
that it is not in the EU’s interest to decrease cooperation with
Russia in the short term, but rather to work toward deepening
that relationship; to incorporate rather than confront. It pro-
ceeds with an analysis of Ukraine’s depreciating role in EU
energy security and the EU-Russia trade relationship followed
by a brief exploration of two possible futures in the relation-
ship between Brussels andMoscow and concludes with policy
guidance.
The shrinking reliance on Ukraine as a transit state
The threat perception in the context of the 2014 Ukrainian
crisis reflects the painful experiences of the 2009 gas crisis
between Russia and Ukraine when 80 % of gas intended for
Europe had to transit the latter. That crisis affected many EU
member states, when in the middle of a cold winter the
supplies through Ukraine were interrupted for 2 weeks. Since
then the situation has changed. The Nord Stream Pipelines (in
operation since 2011) now directly link Russia and Germany
and, together with warmer winters and a recessed economy
that dampened demand, has reduced significantly the annual
gas flows transiting Ukraine. According to the Oxford Energy
Institute, Russia now relies on Ukraine to transit circa half of
its gas exports to Europe [6], a change that also reduces the
threat that Kiev’s siphoning of gas, which it did in 2009, could
disrupt Russian supplies.
Bringing projects like South Stream or its heirs online will
further reduce that dependency. South Stream is a Gazprom led
project with major EU shareholders, planned for completion by
2020 that could provide 63 bcm (billion cubic metres) of Russian
controlled gas directly to the EU. The future of the pipeline was
thrown into limbo when Russian President Vladimir Putin sud-
denly announced Russia’s withdrawal from the project in early
December and proposed alternatively to send gas to Turkey and
build a hub on the Turkey-Greek border. Nevertheless, if Nord
Stream and a southern route sibling are operating at full capacity
by 2020 and EU annual demand for Russian gas continues to
stagnate or even decline via increased efficiency or through the
introduction of new suppliers, the share of Ukrainian transited
gas could drop as low as 20 %.
There is no mystery to what is happening here. Russia is
seeking new pipelines to bypass Ukraine. Direct deliveries to
Europe make it easier for Moscow to guarantee gas flows to
Europe in return for vital revenues, a cornerstone of Russia’s
energy security strategy. Nord Stream was the first step in this
direction. It would be delivering much more gas to Europe if the
EuropeanCommissionwould lift its objections toGazprom’s use
of its Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (OPAL), which could
deliver Nord Stream’s gas to central Europe. Those restrictions
essentially cut Nord Stream’s 55 bcm throughput capacity in half.
For Russia, South Stream or any southern-route alternative is
thus the next logical step. Some analysts suggest that it is
cheaper for Moscow to build South Stream rather than to keep
the transit routes through Ukraine [7]. From the EU’s perspec-
tive, the real question is whether it matters if Russian gas flows
through Ukraine or through a new pipeline that is largely under
its control until it reaches the border of the EU. Either way
Moscowwill continue to supply large volumes of gas to the EU
in the medium term; that is for the next 8–9 years when several
of the major existing long-term gas supply contracts (LTCs) run
out. It is precisely within this time frame of the coming decade
where European energy security can make a quantum leap
forward. While LNG cannot replace piped Russian gas today,
the market may mature enough by 2020–25 to offer a real
alternative just at the time when new negotiations with Russia
will be in full swing. Currently, EU LNG import capacity is
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around 192 bcm per year including Turkey’s two terminals.
Add another 5 terminals under construction and 16 in the
planning stage and Europe could be able to import as much
as 315 bcm by the time new long-term contracts are necessary.
Right now LNG is not an option. It is too expensive in
comparison to Russian gas largely because Japan has been
paying a premium to make up for its shortfall in nuclear power
following the Fukushima disaster. Yet new gasification facilities
are coming online along the Atlantic basin. Where LNG
amounted to less than 10 % of the world trade in gas 20 years
ago it now stands at over 30 % of all gas traded worldwide.
Germany and Italy, the EU’s first and third largest gas markets
are both planning new LNG facilities and the US is widely
expected to begin exporting LNG at scale around 2018. Grow-
ing by circa four percent annually, BP expects the global trade
in LNG to rise to as much as 46 % by 2035 [8]. Russia is
investing (together with the UK’s BP) in LNG export options
that will capitalize on increased Japanese demand, which even-
tuallywill alleviate themarket by reducing demand from distant
suppliers freeing up LNG supplies at lower prices for Europe.
One example of the future importance of LNG can bewitnessed
today in Lithuania, which opened a new LNG terminal in its
Baltic Sea port of Klaipeda in late October. The leased terminal
will allow Vilnius to buy 540 mcm of gas from the Norway’s
Statoil as of early 2015 and then up to 4 bcm per year once the
Baltic nation’s deal with Gazprom expires in late 2015. Its 4
bcm capacity more than covers all the gas supplied by Russian
pipelines to Lithuania in the past and substantially enhances the
energy security of the three Baltic states with a capacity to cover
90% of their annual gas needs [9]. In short, the EU can wait out
the current crisis, stabilize direct flows of Russian gas and allow
the LNG market to settle such that in 10 years it can look
forward to a more stable international gas supply market, one
in which perhaps consumers and not suppliers will set prices.
None of this bodes particularly well for Ukraine. In the long
run, Russia’s new supply routes to Europe are freeing up time
and resources for the EU to maximize returns resulting from
structural changes in the international gas market. Thus, no
matter how one looks at it, Ukraine is declining in importance
for EU energy security.Whether losing the transit rentswill make
Ukraine more or less stable in the future is difficult to assess at
this point. It may be that cutting Ukraine out of the EU’s energy
dependency chain will shift too much political power to Russia.
Thinking so, however, rests on the assumption that the EU needs
Russia more than vice-versa, which we show below to be a
misinterpretation of the constellation between the two powers.
The EU-Russian economic relationship – a story
of interdependence
One of the major arguments in the debate over the EU’s energy
relationship with Russia is the assumption that high levels of
economic interdependence between states decrease the proba-
bility of political conflict. Empirical studies show how that
process functions under conditions of balanced interdepen-
dence and how when one side is more dependent on the other,
the probability of the conflict increases [10–12].What exactly is
the state of the EU-Russia trade balance? Is it really incompat-
ible with a stable and balanced relationship? In the EU-Russia
context, the EU depends on oil and gas imports from Russia.
But because it lacks a strong industrial sector, Russia depends
on oil and gas revenues. Thus, even though the EU will need
Russian energy supplies for the foreseeable future, unless it
finds a substantial and sustainable alternative suitor, Russia will
desperately need continued EU investment for its stagnating
economy. In short, Moscow needs the EU as an export market
for its energy products as much as it needs European goods,
services, and FDI to keep functioning economically.
According to the European Commission [13], Russia is the
EU’s third largest trading partner. While Russia exports raw
materials to the EU (mostly crude and refine oil and gas), the
EU supplies Russia with a diverse array of machinery, transport
equipment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and agricultural products.
This translated into an €86.7 billion trade advantage for Russia in
goods in 2013, but the EU exported twice as much in terms of
services (€29.1 to €15.1 billion) in 2012 and held a surplus of
FDI, that is stock investments, of over €112 billion. Indeed, some
75 % of Foreign Direct Investment in Russia originates from the
EU making Russia proverbially married economically to the EU.
In addition to FDI, many EU member states export a
significant share of industrial goods to Russia. Approximately
47 % of all EU exports to Russia in 2013 were in the form of
machinery and transport equipment, essential products for
infrastructure development and economic growth. If one cal-
culates European investments in Russia into the trade picture,
Moscow does not come out the dominant player (see Table 1).
Germany provides a good example of EU-Russian interde-
pendence. Germany exported over €76 billion to Russia in
2013; a decline of five percent off the previous year. By
Table 1 The EU’s trade balance with Russia (in €billions)
2011 2012 2013
Goods −92,7 −91,7 −86,7
Services 9,9 14,1 n/a
FDI 112,2 112,9 n/a
Balance 29,4 35,3
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comparison it exported €88 billion to the US and over €100
billion to France. Its overall trade deficit with Russia in 2013
was less than €5 billion, and almost all of Moscow’s imports
came in the form of oil and gas. In other words, even a slight
reduction in German imports of Russian gas could bring them
in perfect balance in terms of goods; and that is excluding
German FDI in Russia, which was almost €16 billion in 2013.
Germany’s biggest concern, therefore, is not a Russian cut-off
of energy supplies. The latter has been a reliable supplier for
decades. Rather, it is that economic stagnation or even decline
in Russia would hurt German export revenues. While decreas-
ing energy imports from Russia might endanger some EU
exports (assuming that demand declines for high quality Eu-
ropean and particularly German goods or that Russians buy
these goods elsewhere), it is certainly not likely given how
important such goods are to Russian economic development.
Meanwhile, Russia’s steadily increasing share of the EU
energy market via its state dominated gas giant Gazprom is as
much a sign of opportunity as it is risk for the Union. Gazprom
currently holds shares of nine major Transmission System
Operators (TSO) in eight EU member states (see Table 2),
but has a controlling share in only two cases. Instead of
endangering European energy security, those investments cre-
ate opportunities to subject Russian business practices to EU
norms and lock Russia’s economic fate to that of the Union.
One would be remiss not to consider this essential bond
between Russia and the EU. For the foreseeable future, neither
has viable alternative to cooperation. Whether it likes it or not,
the EU needs a reliable energy supplier with a stable economy
for investments and exports. And Russia needs a reliable
partner. The EU could capitalize on this existing interdepen-
dence by offering Moscow increased rather than reduced
investments in its energy sector, which in turn would foster
continued export of cheap gas and oil to Europe and increased
LNG to Japan and the Asian market, laying the foundation for
enhanced long-term energy security for both parties.
Two futures
The preceding analysis infers two possible futures for EU-
Russian relations. On one hand, the EU could take the current
Ukraine crisis as the impetus to reset its relationship with
Russia by making any future investments in its energy sector
as well as Russian investment in the EU contingent upon an
EU-favourable solution in Ukraine. In this future, the EU
would move rapidly to divest from Russia, accepting higher
gas prices and increasing its use of coal to offset the resulting
economic cost, in order to win the political and moral high
ground (at the cost of its environmental goals) in the short
term with the hope of achieving greater energy independence
in the long run. On the other hand, the EU could deepen its
relationship with Russia by increasing its FDI in the latter’s
gas and oil sectors, and accept Russian interests in its near
abroad at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty with the hope that
doing so will establish common ground for a long-term eco-
nomic and political stability between the two neighbours. In
this future, Eastern Ukraine becomes a de facto protectorate of
Moscow bordering on a West Ukraine that adheres to the
energy acquis and South Stream or its successor delivers over
60 bcm annually to South, Central and Eastern Europe for
decades to come. The future thus depends on a strategic choice
between confrontation and accommodation and Moscow can-
not be expected to make it an easy one.
The fact is that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision
of a resurgent Russia is tied to state control of energy re-
sources at home and abroad [14], a policy approach that is
directly at odds with the EU’s open market ideals. Seen in the
light of Putin’s grand plan to “have a large impact on the world
commodities market” [14: p.51], Russia’s concerns about EU
diplomatic efforts to export common rules rooted in the EU’s
energy acquis, its neighbourhood policy, its seemingly unstop-
pable enlargement process, its attempts to meddle in the
political affairs of Ukraine and Georgia, and its efforts to
bypass Russia in accessing Caspian Littoral resources take
on added meaning. These areas are not only historically
central to Russian security thinking, they also are an essential
part of the country’s national energy export infrastructure and,
thus, an indispensable component of Russian capability to
project economic power.
Russia knows that East and Southeast Europe constitute the
EU’s contemporary energy lifeline and its main choke point.
When it seized the Crimea inMarch 2014, the largest importer
of Russian gas, Germany, did little more than offer tough talk.
As Donald Tusk, the prime minister of Poland tersely noted at
the time, “Germany’s reliance on Russian gas can effectively
limit European sovereignty” [15]. For Moscow and its strate-
gy to keep its gas flowing to Europe and the latter’s money
flowing back to Moscow, Ukraine’s vacillating orientation
between east and west is unacceptable and Russia is rightly
concerned about the spill over effects caused by domestic
Table 2 Gazprom shares in the EU energy companies
Country Company Gazprom’s share in EU TSOs
Bulgaria Overgas Inc. 0.49 % OAO Gazprom
49.51 % ООО Gazprom Export
Estonia Eesti Gaas 6.38 %
Finland Gasum Oy 25 %
Germany Wingas GmbH 100 %
Latvia Latvijas Gaze 34 %
Lithuania Amber Grid (AB) 37.1 %
Lietuvos Dujos 37.06 %
Poland EuRoPol Gaz 48 %
UK (UK) LIMITED 10 %
Source: Authors based on Gazprom public records
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instability in Ukraine and Belarus. Its southern borders are
porous at best, and the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014
ouster of pro-Russian President Yanukovych in Ukraine
reminded Moscow of the vulnerable nature of the countries
along its periphery. The EU’s efforts to negotiate an associa-
tion agreement with Kiev directly challenged Russia’s so-
called sphere of influence and exacerbated Russian concerns
about EU intentions. Given the constellation of powers and
interests in East and Southeast Europe, there should be little
wonder why Russia is seeking alternative energy transit routes
around Ukraine. Since the region around Ukraine also serves
as a possible future transit route for Caspian and Central
Eurasian energy resources destined for the EU, Europe cer-
tainly can expect heightened tensions with Russia over every-
thing from pipeline routes to election monitoring.
For the EU to secure its short and medium term energy
needs, it may need to placate Russian concerns and cater to
Moscow’s demands for regional domination and neighbourly
suzerainty. Doing this, however, runs contrary to Brussels’
political leanings and interests. Clearly, Europe needs a strat-
egy to deal with its massive Eastern neighbour and energy
supplier. Public declarations to reduce dependency on Russia
are not going to convince Moscow to loosen its grip on the
Eastern European transit states. In fact, it may cause the
opposite effect, with the additional detriment of dividing the
Union.
Finding an alternative to Russian oil and gas is not just a
principle problem for Brussels. It is a matter of practicality and
prudence. Europe faces more competition for energy re-
sources in Central Eurasia than anywhere else in the world.
Both China and Russia straddle the region. The EU does not.
Therefore, in order to secure the region’s oil or gas, either
Brussels or a collection of EU based companies will have to
spend a fortune and do so almost entirely on local terms. Even
if Europe were ultimately to succeed in landing contracts and
building pipelines, the EU will find itself at a distinct disad-
vantage in Central Eurasia. Russia is without question the
region’s dominant military and economic power. It has dem-
onstrated its capability and will to secure its interests across
the region repeatedly over the last two centuries and remains
the primary trading partner for all of the former Soviet
Republics.
That is where Ukraine comes back into the picture because
that is where the future of the Russia-EU relationship is being
tested. Establishing economic and political stability in
Ukraine and integrating the latter into bothmarkets is essential
for Europe. Brussels cannot politically afford to allow Russia
to subsumeUkraine. But Europe should not overplay its cards.
Eastern Ukraine’s importance to Russia goes beyond national
identities. The former hosts factories and expertise for key
components of the latter’s nuclear and ballistic missile forces.
Thus, Russia and the EU need to reach a settlement over the
future of Ukraine that incorporates its decreasing role in their
energy relationship and takes into context the complex inter-
dependent nature of the EU-Russian relationship and the
legacies of the Cold War. The benefits of doing so far out-
weigh the costs associated with downgrading their energy
relationship. To be certain, the EU should be concerned about
the future of the eastern European neighbourhood and should
work to prevent a major shift of power towards Russia.
However, focusing on short term strategies to diversify sup-
pliers and challenging Russia rather than deepening its already
existing cooperative trade and investment relationship will
come at a price for European energy consumers that most
are not prepared to pay. Either way, Ukraine will be squeezed
out of the energy equation.
Next steps
So what should Europe do in regard to its energy relationship
with Russia in light of Ukraine crisis? The European Com-
mission (May 2014) [16] suggests continuing with its planned
infrastructure programs, internal market policies, and increas-
ing shares of renewables. That is simply not enough. Nor is
downgrading the energy relationship with Russia in the hope
that it will in any manner increase the EU’s influence over the
future of Ukraine or affect Russian interests in its near abroad.
Rashly breaking off interdependencies in the short term could
concurrently lead to more aggressive policies by Russia and
its state dominated corporate energy agents and bring higher
gas prices to EU consumers. Conversely, deeper relations will
afford the EU the opportunity to maximize its influence over
Russian policy in Eastern and Central Europe and the Caspian
Littoral, induce Moscow to reform its economy, and win time
both to develop domestic gas and renewables at home and for
international LNG prices to come down. In this vein, we
suggest three specific courses of action.
First, the EU should push to establish an energy union
comprising inter alia a large scale joint R&D program to
improve existing renewable technology, a transparent joint
fossil resource management system, a transparent system of
gas storage facilities and emergency distribution plans, a joint
management of intermittency problems, and subsidies for gas
in order to curb the increasing use of cheap coal. Such a union
could significantly improve relations with Russia and increase
the EU bargaining power in the medium to long term. Like-
wise, the EU should make a serious push to deepen the energy
relationship with Ankara by extending the existing Energy
Community to Turkey and thus pave the way for future gas
flows resulting from a rapprochement between Iran and the
West and the coming flows of Israeli/Cypriot gas.
In a sign that Jean-Claude Juncker and his team are all in on
bringing about the formalization of a European energy union,
the new head of DG energy, Maroš Šefčovič, now carries the
apt title Vice President for Energy Union. Although symbolic,
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such a development is a good sign. However, any future
energy union should avoid the controversial single buyer
model as proposed by Polish Prime Minister Tusk [17]. De-
spite the fact that some member states already operate the
single buyer model (e.g. the National Balancing Point in the
UK and Title Transfer Facility in the Netherlands), such a
move at the community level would task the Commission to
negotiate gas contracts on behalf of the EU. While this would
unite EU purchasing power, it also would make the Commis-
sion a central commodity manager that sets prices. In other
words, it would bring back the public utility model of the
1970s – i.e. a regulated market without competition – some-
thing that the EU struggled so long and hard to liberalize. As
one energy expert sharply noted, such a move makes “no
economic or commercial sense”, but instead amounts to “po-
litical posturing” rather than a serious policy proposal [18].
Second, the EU should back the building of new import
infrastructure projects. This requires supporting South Stream or
its heirs and making a major investment in the Southern Corridor
including large volume pipelines transiting Turkey to its eastern
borders and southeastern Mediterranean coast. It also means
increasing the reverse flow capacities within the EU. The EU’s
only alternative to cheap gas right now is cheaper coal, which is a
veritable disaster for EU environmental policy. Meanwhile, Rus-
sia has the gas that the EU needs now and European firms have
made substantial investments in South Stream. The EU also has
the internal network to move gas north or south. Allowing Nord
Stream to fill OPAL could immediately maximize Germany’s
import capacity and alleviate some of the legitimate concerns
about winter supplies if the Ukrainian crisis continues unabated.
Currently, most EU states support South Stream despite the
difficulty with Moscow, but some members of the European
Parliament are raising concerns. Those concerns need to be
addressed and Europe needs to move forward. With Crimea
firmly in its hands, Russia soon will be able to move gas via
South Stream or its successor directly to the EU’s southeastern
member states, a la Nord Stream. Because a southern diver-
sion has the potential to significantly decrease the importance
of Ukraine as a transit country, it will enhance the EU’s
security of supply while affording Brussels the time necessary
for the international gas market to turn in the EU’s favour, an
opportunity that should not be missed. But if the EU really
wants to consider liberating itself from Russian gas, the big-
gest prize will not be South Stream, but rather Iraqi and
Iranian gas, neither of which will flow en masse in the next
few years. By itself that is not a problem because it will take at
least 5 years, if not ten, to get the infrastructure in place to
deliver that gas. Europe needs to begin building the pipelines
capable of delivering that gas now.
Third, the EU has to put massive investments into energy
research. Currently, the efficiency of renewable energy
sources is rather modest and the intermittency problem re-
mains unsolved. If Europe wants to stay committed to its
climate goals in all its manifold iterations, it must significantly
intensify its efforts in this area. While the EU is spending
considerable amounts on nuclear fusion research projects (e.g.
ITER) other highly important fields need more attention rang-
ing from energy storage to biomass, from increasing energy
efficiency in order to achieve energy savings to the econom-
ically viable reduction of emissions.
Whether or not Ukraine’s descent into EU energy security
inconsequence is good or bad for Europe depends on which
outcome is more important. Reliance on Russian gas is not
necessarily a bad thing if its supply is reliable, cheap and free
of expensive political payoffs such as further expansionist
gains or the rise of a vast non-liberal market to the east. Yet
as Nord Stream demonstrates, Russia and EU energy compa-
nies value reliable long-term direct links over transit options,
even if the initial investment costs seem prohibitive. South
Stream or any alternative southern detour may not be the most
profitable in the short run, but it will absolve Russia from the
threat of a transit state siphoning off its gas to Europe, and that
is certainly in the interest both parties. In the short to medium
term this could make the EU concurrently more reliant on
cheap Russian gas, more secure in its supply, and put it back
on track to cut out its uncomfortable dependence on coal. In
the long run, it frees up time and resources to maximize return
resulting from structural changes in the international gas mar-
ket. Breaking the EU’s energy and trade relationship with
Russia over Ukraine may seem to some to be the right ‘feel
good’ thing to do here and now. But completely eliminating it
is neither politically nor economically prudent.
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